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PREFACE
Strategic planning, as we understand the term, concerns the methods and mechanics of waging
war. It is the business of the professional military men . . . . The formulation of military policy,
on the other hand, means to us the determination of whether and when and under what
circumstances and for what purposes we should go to war. It concerns political decisions rather
than military methods and is the business of the Congress and ultimately of the people in our
democracy.
From an editorial "Policy and Strategy"
The Providence Journal
September 19, 1949

When the 104th Congress convened in January 1995, a long simmering debate came to a boil
over a proposed display of the Enola Gay at the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum in
Washington, D.C. The Enola Gay was the B-29 that dropped the atom bomb on Hiroshima on 6
August 1945. Peace activists and some historians, who considered the bombing an American
disgrace, favored graphic depictions and narratives describing the bomb's devastation.
Veterans' groups and others objected. They wanted text material that explained what led to the
bombing -- the already high American casualties in the Pacific War (150,000 killed or wounded
on both sides in the battle for Okinawa alone) -- and note taken on the projected allied and
Japanese casualties when Japan's home islands were invaded.
Apologists for dropping the bomb base their case largely on the thousands of civilian casualties
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The inference was that not only were these civilian casualties, but
innocent civilian casualties.
This essay looks at the issue of civilian casualties in various types of armed conflict some 50
years later and discusses a number of questions that are but logical extensions of the Enola Gay
debate.
In January of 1994, the U.S. Naval Institute published an article, "Getting It Right From . . . the
Sea," by General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. While the article
dealt with the effective and efficient use of naval expeditionary (task) forces, primarily with
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respect to regional conflicts, of equal interest was the way in which a commandant of the
Marine Corps, perhaps the most no-nonsense branch of our armed forces, viewed (1) total and
less than total wars, (2) collateral damage, (3) the use or non-use of various weapons in our
arsenal, and (4) the political costs incurred when American armed forces are put in harms way.
Not addressed, however, was whether senior military officers should share responsibility with
political leaders, that is, become decision makers with regard to when and where to commit
forces, with what weapons, and under what constraints.
To quote General Mundy:
In addition, we cannot ignore the political ramifications of collateral damage that
even precision weapons can cause. In wars that are less than total-potentially,
most of our future wars-we may not be able to use weapons, however effective,
if their political cost outweighs their tactical gain. There may be a time and place
when near perfect accuracy just will not be good enough. That is not a pleasant
thought, but it is a consideration we cannot ignore when we look at new
systems and the application of existing technologies. (3)
Questions:
What difference, if any, is there between total war and less than total war? What
are the implications for our armed forces, particularly our combat forces, if a
distinction is made?
Discussion:
The model for total war is World War II. The London blitz, the bombing of
Coventry, Cologne, and Dresden, the siege of Stalingrad, the fire bombings of
Japanese cities and the later use of atomic weapons, leave no doubt about the
totality of the conflict. On the other hand, Korea, Vietnam, and the 1991 Gulf
War were characterized by the restrained use of weapons and military options.
In total war, the goal of national leadership historically has been to bring about
the surrender or unconditional surrender of the enemy.(4) The objective military
function is to achieve this end at a minimum cost in lives and national treasure.
Total war is also an unambiguous concept and generally understood by those
doing the fighting. Limited wars, on the other hand, imply limited goals and as
such are ambiguous and complex concepts. This ambiguity requires that the
nation's leaders, both civilian and military, constantly explain and rationalize the
reason for the conflict, a task which becomes increasingly difficult as time passes
and, casualties mount.
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Again quoting General Mundy:
In the future, we will . . . be operating in a political environment in which there is
an "economy of will." The American people will not tolerate high casualties in
military operations they do not view as critical to our national security. Either
under U.N. auspices, or multilaterally-or even unilaterally-many of our likely
tasks will not affect the national security of the United States directly. Many of
our future operations are going to have objectives that-while important in a
regional sense-may not be seen as vital in Peoria.5
While ambiguous and complex politics are fairly open to debate by the
electorate, from military tactics to broad issues of national policy, such debate
cannot be limited to the home front. In an age of instant communication, the
issues will also be argued at every level of the military establishment. After all is
said and done, is the soldier, sailor and airman doing the fighting more willing to
fight, and possibly die, for something he understands than for something he
does not?
The use of limited military force and by definition, limited political objectives, has a poor track
record in the West. Witness Korea, the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, Lebanon, Iran and Iraq. Our cold
war adversaries, however, used whatever force was necessary to achieve their objectives.
Witness the swift dispatch of the Czech and Hungary uprisings by the Soviet Union, the
crushing of Tibet dissidents by the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and the more recent
crushing of Chechnya's rebellion by Russian military forces. Afghanistan was a Soviet failure
but only because the United States decided to contest the outcome.
Question:
Is weaponry for total war significantly different than weaponry for less than
total war? Under what circumstances, if any, is the use of atomic weapons an
option? If there is a difference between weapons dependent upon what type of
conflict is being waged, what is the implication for defense spending?
Discussion:
Improving weapon accuracy, that is, hitting what you aim at with a high
probability of success, is certainly an acceptable goal of military research and
development. The more accurate the weapon, the less chance it will have to be
used a second or third time. The savings is easily identifiable in terms of lives
and material. The problem, however, is not with developing so-called smart
weapons but rather the argument that unless a weapon is highly accurate it
should not be used at all, that is, cause collateral damage and kill innocent
civilians.
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From this point the debate can be extended to what constitutes an acceptable
target. An ammunition factory, a bridge, a rail yard, an oil refinery, a column of
tanks, government complexes . . . ? However, as the number of targets grows,
as it will in all conflicts, the number of targets that can be more quickly
destroyed by conventional but less accurate weapons will also grow. In a total
war, no problem arises with respect to the choice of weapons. We use what
accomplishes the task with the least cost in lives and material. In less than total
war, however, an increasingly popular position is to use only accurate weapons
aimed at strictly military targets. Carried to a logical end, this raises the question
of how much money should be allocated to developing and producing
sophisticated, "civilian friendly" weapons and how much should be spent for
conventional weapons that are less accurate but more effective with respect to
most enemy targets. Should a target be destroyed by naval guns, cruise missiles,
or long range artillery with a minimum risk to military personnel or should a
squadron of F-16s fitted with laser guided bombs be used with a much greater
risk to men and equipment . . . very expensive equipment and very expensive
men and women?
As to the willingness to use atomic weapons, peace as between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact for the past 50 years was maintained not because a balance of
conventional forces existed but rather the assured mutual destruction of both
alliances should atomic weapons be used. While mass destruction weapons,
biological and chemical as well as atomic, are hardly civilian friendly, they
nonetheless kept the peace in Europe under the most trying of circumstances.
One might also ask-Is a fourth war between India and Pakistan more or less
likely now that both are atomic powers? Or would conflict between Taiwan and
Communist China be more or less likely if Taiwan, as well as the People's
Republic of China, had nuclear weapons?
Question:
What is the distinction between armed conflict at whatever level and using our
armed forces as peacekeepers in combat areas? What implication does such a
difference have with respect to training doctrine?
Discussion:
The distinction between total war, less than total war, and peacekeeping as a
military operation is simply one of degree. In total war, the use of available
weapons is seldom constrained. Civilian casualties, innocent and otherwise, are
accepted. In less than total war the use of available weapons is constrained while
political goals constrain military options. In the role of peacekeepers, our armed
forces must adapt to the role of a typical police force. When deadly force may be
used is tightly proscribed . . . generally not to fire until fired upon. While we
have not come to the point of "Mirandizing" a potential enemy . . . we are
coming very close.
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Developing a training doctrine for combat forces across a range of conflict
situations is no easy task, if it can be accomplished at all. Infantry basic training
which for the moment, still includes instruction in hand to hand combat where
the objective is to kill or be killed, is hardly an option when the mission is to
disarm an enemy but in no case do him bodily harm. Few would point to
Somalia and Bosnia as success stories wherein military forces were used in a
peacekeeper role.
Question:
What is the definition of collateral damage? Correspondingly, is there such a
thing as innocent civilians in war, no matter what the conflict may be called?
Discussion:
Collateral damage is "spillover" damage inflicted on adjacent or nearby
structures and populations when the intended target is destroyed or damage
caused when the intended target is only partially destroyed or missed entirely.
Collateral damage becomes visible and controversial when it includes civilian
casualties.6
As to whether collateral damage in all of its aspects, including civilian casualties,
can be avoided is an impossible question. It comes down to whether it is
acceptable to kill a civilian while he/she is at work in a ammunitions factory,
railway yard or utility plant, as opposed to killing him in his home which was
destroyed in an attack on an otherwise acceptable military target.
The other side of the coin is whether or not there is such a thing as a
casualty-free conflict. One unintended result of the Gulf War is that the public
has come to expect minimum military casualties when our forces are committed
to combat. There is, however, a basic contradiction here. In many instances,
weapons that inflict collateral damage are the ones that minimize the risk to our
military personnel, while civilian friendly weapons are not only more expensive
but increase the risk to those charged with delivering them.7
Question:
If a distinction is to be made as between a limited war and total war, where does
responsibility lie with respect to deciding which type of conflict it will be?
Discussion:
As to which type of war our armed forces will be asked to fight and who is to
decide should never be in question. The responsibility is that of the President of
the United States.
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Question:
If senior military officers become a part of the decision process, that is, decision
makers, with respect to which type of war will be waged, can they then in good
faith uphold and support the oldest of military traditions-an officer's
responsibility for the well being and safety of the men and women under this
command?
Discussion:
Few political leaders, whether presidents or other high level civilian decision
makers, are willing to unconditionally accept responsibility for deciding under
what circumstances to commit our armed forces and accept responsibility for the
casualties that follow. President Harry Truman's decision to use atomic weapons
against Japan and to accept full responsibility for his decision, is an exception to
the general rule. On the other hand, the Vietnam War is a casebook study of
where the line between traditional military decisions and political decisions
became indistinguishable. The debate as to where blame lies for North
Vietnam's conquest of the South is ongoing and probably will never be agreed
upon.8
In deciding the level of conflict and, by definition, the constraints imposed, the
Commander in Chief does not lack for civilian advice and expertise. Long
recognized sources include the National Security Council, the State Department,
the Central Intelligence Agency, the President's cabinet, his civilian appointees in
the Department of Defense, and knowledgeable members of Congress.
Laying out costs in terms of casualties and material and the likelihood of success
of various options put forth by civilian authorities is, however, a military
responsibility. But tasking our military leaders to be part of the decision process
with respect to deciding on the level of conflict and the constraints to be imposed
on military action puts them in an untenable position with respect to their first
duty-the well being of those under their command.9 By definition, this includes
doing all possible to minimize casualties.
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Conclusion
With the adoption of the American Constitution over 200 years ago, the United States asserted
in unambiguous language that the nation's military would be subordinate to civilian authority.
The power to declare war was delegated to the Congress.10 Also implied was that conduct of
foreign policy rest with the Executive Branch of government.
Throughout World War II, the different responsibilities of the military, the executive, and
Congress in time of conflict, as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, were generally
adhered to with little debate. After World War II, however, things changed. A Joint Chiefs of
Staff, headed by a chairman, was specifically tasked to give advice to the President on military
matters. The secretaries of War (Army), Navy and Air Force became subordinate to the
Secretary of Defense with only nominal authority over the services they headed. The Office of
the Joint Chiefs became in fact, if not name, a fourth branch of service.
Armed conflicts became police actions, regional conflicts, people's revolutions, insurrections,
undeclared wars, covert operations, and United Nations missions, but never total wars. When
General Mundy stated that most of our future wars will be less than total wars he should have
also noted that all conflicts involving American forces over the past 50 years have been less
than total wars.
Why conflicts in the last half of the 20th century were something less than total wars is not hard
to understand given that the world was essentially divided into two powerful military alliances,
each having the ability to destroy the other many times over. A declared war could escalate
into a total war, a contingency which neither side wanted. Thus did armed conflicts become less
than total wars with limited goals and constraints on military options while military options
that might lead to total war were studiously avoided. In such a cold war environment decisions
with respect to when and at what level conflicts should be fought became joint decisions
between military and civilian leaders. And as in the case of most joint committee-type decisions,
accountability for a particular decision made was no longer possible. The Vietnam War was a
textbook case in this respect. Generals became politicians, politicians became generals, while
combat forces became replaceable pawns in a seemingly never ending chess game.
A second result of keeping conflicts at a below total war threshold was a growing public
expectation that less than total wars, whatever they were called, should be civilian casualty free.
Now, in the last decade of the 20th century, the world has changed again. With the collapse of
the Soviet Union the probability of a total war on the scale of World War II has greatly
diminished. In this new environment it is time to reexamine the decision making process which
leads to committing American armed forces to combat. That a reexamination is called for can be
seen in the public's resistance to committing our armed forces to conflicts where no overriding
U.S. national interest is at stake as poll after poll has shown.
One way to address the public's concern is a return to accountability where our civilian leaders,
and them alone, make the decision of when to commit forces, where to commit forces, and
what constraints are to be placed on military action.11 Once these decisions have been made,
our military leaders become accountable for achieving civilian determined goals at the least cost
in lives and material. But more important, those who lead can once again, in clear conscious,
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carry out their first dutyÑthe well being of those under their command. Field Marshall William
Slim, commanding officer of British forces in Burma in World War II, probably said it best and
for all time:
I tell you, as officers, that you will not eat, sleep, smoke, sit down, or lie down
until your soldiers have had a chance to do these things. If you will hold to this,
they will follow you to the ends of the earth. If you do not, I will break you in
front of your regiments. 12
Stated another way by a civilian:
When an officer accepts command of troops, he accepts not only the
responsibility of accomplishing a mission, but the guardianship of those who
serve under his command. The military hierarchy exists and can function
because enlisted personnel entrust their well-being and their lives to those with
command authority. When those in command authority either abdicate that
authority or neglect that guardianship, more is lost than lives. Lost also is the
trust that enables those who follow to follow those who lead. 13
Representative Dan Daniel, In hearings on the Beirut tragedy:
To paraphrase Field Marshall Slim. "Give our forces a clearly stated reason to
fight for a clearly stated end. Do all in our power to minimize the inevitable
casualties they will suffer, including use, as appropriate, all weapons available.
Do this and they will be little concerned with what the conflict is called."14
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